After an election break, I’ve decided to resume my series on Canadian defence—particularly what I would do if the Prime Minister drank too much wine one night and made me defence minister.
Thanks for an informative update. From the 50's school days when "duck and cover" was introduced as response to nuclear war, most people go on living with hope and prayers. Military investment always seemed best left to "sometime later" for concern. Recently techie griftors are making it seem like now is surely the time.
Yes to all that, but it still seems to be overly constrained within an air domain context, once again assuming only the CAF will work this problem. If we consider a broader joint/interdepartmental paradigm, I can see a network of planes, satellites, ground stations, and appropriately designed/equipped ships (Imagine CF Base Cambridge Bay and CF Base Resolute). The placement and building of radar stations can serve as local development/employment too. All this in support of the 'build Canadian stuff to be under Canadian control' approach.
I'm warming to the idea of a two-fighter fleet in the RCAF, one for North America, the other for NATO. I get the traditional angst over multi-fleet complications, but I like the idea of a significantly larger air force that has the capacity to launch and sustain numerous Arctic region interceptions over a significant period of time (and not rely on US aircraft). We need capacity as well as capability. Growth would support permanent basing in the North... which is where other government departments would come in to support such development.
I also think the time is coming when we will have to talk about NATO operations in the Arctic Region. Maybe Canada can host the NATO Allied Command Arctic HQ in Churchill, or Iqaluit.
Usually unaddressed in these kinds of discussions is the distinct challenge of defending ourselves all the kit we would permanently base in the Arctic. There are obvious threats from hypersonic weapons. How do we defend Alert today? Masset? Gander? How would we defend the results of future developments and deployments?
Our defence conversations in Canada are still too nice. We must not only see what is coming (whether aimed at Canada or en route to the US), we must be prepared and able to kill it, preferably before its over our land mass.
Herein lies the problem, and I couldn’t get into multiple levels of detail in a short piece. I write for the layman, not the expert.
You make excellent points, though, and I’m entirely on net. The problem will become that the government will need to invest in *lethal* capabilities, something you and I both know they’re reluctant to do. We need to get the CAF out of the constabulary business; that means platforms that are properly equipped to deal with threats.
I’ve said elsewhere that I think “bases” in the traditional sense are a non-starter, largely for infrastructure and support/quality of life reasons. Will we get there? Maybe, but it would take a substantial effort and multiple levels of buy-in.
We’re stuck with NORAD but we can do a *lot* to increase our sovereign participation, as you point out.
I agree with your dislike of talk about 'plunking' a base down here or there and calling it a capability. The fundamental issue here is the absence of a national effort to really develop the North, an effort within which there would be a catalytic role for well-placed CF bases. But even then, in the absence of an overall strategic concept of how we will defend Canada, it is difficult to envision, let alone rationalize the broad laydown/network of bases required across the country. Maybe we go beyond your 'traditional' sense of what a 'base' is. There's room for imagination here, given modern technology, AI, and capable Canadians across the North,.
This is true, but I’m not sure the modern CAF could sustain isolated installations where units are permanently stationed.
Why?
Because, as I’ve pointed out elsewhere, the troops expect - as you certainly know - infrastructure that currently can’t be supported in the North and won’t be for some time. This mainly centres on family support and support for spouses working careers of their own. Moreover, we’d be looking at a massive investment in housing, etc..
I just don’t think the North is ready for that yet.
But we do indeed need a coherent, global strategy. If you’ve read my article on Arctic defence, I’m not entirely convinced that we should be putting all our eggs in the Arctic basket.
i have been puzzling over how we as a nation could maintain an effective presence in the North, with a lethal combined arms force, and a few ideas keep coming back. Having only been an Eleve Officier, my detailed knowledge is thin, but the logic make sense. To me at least.
The original design for a tank based force as suggest by De Gaulle is a good starting point: since we have an enormous area to cover, a highly mobile force or groups permanently deployed to the field would be the most effective way to bring boots, bombs and drones to bear on any intruders or invaders. Amphibious units combined with helicopter mobile vehicles, with submarines as scouts and possibly even supply vessels, would be able to establish temporary bases from which fixed wing aircraft could operate, and can serve as base camps for patrolling. And when its time to move on, the runway is packed up and moves
Radar systems that need a permanent base and power will always be a problem, but having very mobile air defences with some fixed ground defences to slow and entangle any assaulting forces would give a mobile response time to counter-attack.
Maintaining such a force would be expensive since the North demands extreme attention to detail and preparation of you want to survive, let alone fight. But as opposed to dotting the North with fixed bases, I think t would be more cost effective.
If we were able to field a Brigade to support NATO, I think a couple of Airborne Regiments equipped with sufficient helicopters, some winter-proven, Chinook transportable LAV that could be fitted out to carry mortars, radar, AAA, SAM, C&C, and maybe some larger calibre direct fire gun would bring enough lethal firepower to bear.
And the Navy would need a similar variety of smaller vessels for patrolling, and intercepting intruders. The Navy would need amphibious assets to assist in moving the units around: muskeg is impassible in the endless summer sun, where the ability to use rivers, lakes and muskeg to get around would be essential. Does anyone remember the old “Hammer’s Slammers”? While far from silent, large and small hovercraft would get around far faster than even fast shallow draft boats. And they work well to break up ice, as we’ve seen on the St. Lawrence.
And yes, the RCAF will need some serious investment: 2-3 tanker aircraft, 2-3 AWACS style aircraft, satellites, and last but no least, some fixed wing aircraft from transports to air superiority, that can manage the weather up North.
And lets not forget the Drones. Each Regiment would need integral drone assets, for both above and below surface hunting. And it will take some good old Canadian engineering and know how to make them effective in the cold. Imagine a sub loitering in the NW Passage, when a swarm of Canadian made drone swarm surrounds it, like the biting flies in summer?
The politics to pull all this together will be as equally complicated as the terrain is. But we cannot allow another power like Russia or the US to lay claim by virtue of an undersea mountain range and a few icebreakers poking around. The question is how to pay for it all, because we will need to maintain another regimental sized force in Eastern Europe for the foreseeable future along with Air and Sea assets.
Mr. Carney is going to have to dust off that old magical hat and start searching for some rabbits to get the party started. We have some serious nation building to do. Let’s hope that he can get better trading partners in the East and West, and maybe the Southern Hemisphere, to reduce our reliance on the US. He has a strong bench from which to build his team. Let’s hope they are up for it.
You certainly pack a lot in here, but let me push further. Your remarks are appropriately generic when mentioning a number of capabilities, but we still lack the overall grand-strategic concept that can answer the question, why do we need all that? What will we do with it?
It is an interesting challenge to describe how Canada will fight and prevail in defending itself without mentioning any of: 2% GDP; bases; drones; artillery, fighter jets, or other specific items. Conjure up a sufficiently broad scenario without saying anything about money (not unimportant, but that comes later...).
First, will we fight? Will government have the 'right stuff' to actually motivate Canadians to fight and then have the brains to oversee the national effort. Think about the nature of Ukrainians and their government today. I'm impressed.
Second, how will we fight? Will we actually meet an enemy at the extremities of our sovereign territory, in conventional warfare? I suggest there is some serious study and research to be done here because there has never been a truly "Arctic war" in history. I cannot imagine a more difficult theatre than our Arctic island archipelago. It is a desolate area where everything involves strategic distances, exposed lines of communication, a constant contest between surviving and fighting, and an array of geo-physical forces not found elsewhere on earth (the North Pole is constantly on the move). We might meet an enemy head-on in one place, but redeploying to another threatened sector, at scale, is a monstrous challenge. Sustainment difficulties boggle the mind.
Or, will we do what Russia did to Napoleon, and suck an intruder far into our land mass and then, with the nation in arms, cut them off in the North and let them freeze to death (or be driven crazy by blackflies), or conduct guerrilla warfare and kill enemy troops in the streets of Vancouver, Edmonton, Saskatoon, Winnipeg, Sault Ste. Marie, Timmins, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, Quebec City, Fredericton, Halifax and St. John's? I bet THAT scenario has never come up in a staff college exercise.
In fact, I don't think any staff college (or CAF staff planner for that matter) has ever dealt with any true grand strategy, mobilizing all elements of national power and calling upon all Canadians to fight, in some way. Listen to every defence discussion today and they are all grounded on the narrow assumption that only the CAF will fight. Beyond superficial "Canada not for sale ballcaps, and booing national anthems, and buying Canadian," we've got a serious national will challenge ahead of us.
I'll save my thoughts on the modern nature of Canada's population for later. Spoiler alert, we need more team players and less of those individuals who think its all about them and their feelings.
I concur that the Canadian government and the CAF has not had an overall strategy marking out their priorities in defending the North, or the rest of the country for that matter. I am going to assume that they figured there was no point if a conflict with the USSR went nuclear. Now we are faced with having to defend our sovereignty from two nuclear equipped powers, in the face of asymmetric warfare by the US.
We will be entering an era of open chaos in North America. There are forces operating behind the scenes in the US, Europe and Asia that may see the destruction of the continental US. One scenario that has a growing probability is a break up with billionaires claiming ownership of entire States that have gone bankrupt. And there is a real possibility of famine. Most of the food production in the US is done by immigrant labour, and in States like Nebraska, a significant portion have just left, fearing ICE arrest. So now farmers are unable to plant crops, let alone harvest, as are ranchers and food processors. The billionaires like Peter Thiel and others will use their borrowing capacity to pick up the bankrupted farms and form them into their own kingdoms. Think of Medieval mainland Europe. Already JD Vance is involved in buying up farms through a company called AcreTrader. And it isn't too much of a reach to see the billionaires using mercenary armies like Black Rock to help with the acquisition plans.
So there is an imperative to get to work and build a strategic plan to defend our country.
Now we do have some use for the North, especially with regards to shipping. A usable North West Passage, even if it was open for only half a year would be a shortcut between Europe and the Far East, enough to take weeks off delivery schedules, and save the Canadian Import/Export concerns enough to take notice. It also would provide an alternative route for imports/exports to and from Western Canada if the Great Lakes become unavailable to us.
So we would need to be able to control the Territorial Waters from the Beaufort to the Davis Strait, and up to Ellesmere Island. And this is where my detailed knowledge of costs and capabilities is lacking. But I've always been watching the various conflicts around the globe, and I have a rough idea of what the current CAF capacities are. The Navy's ships haven't changed much in basic design since WWI, for example, so the basic strategy remains the same. See them before the see us, get there first and with enough firepower to destroy the enemy.
The Navy would require surface ships equipped for ice-breaking and sub hunting, submarines to cover under the Ice Cap, and drones to add firepower and supplement reconnaissance capabilities. And the Navy would be the first to benefit from having satellite surveillance and communications. So the first order of building an overall strategy will be to get eyes in the sky. If we cannot produce our own satellites, I'm sure we can buy them from the Europeans and have them launched from an ESA pad. As a stop gap, our own version of an AWACS aircraft with enhanced loitering capacity could help. I'm going to guess that to bring them online would be between $5-10 billion cdn and take 5-7years, with some measure of urgency. You may have a better idea of relative costs, but I think for that kind of money, we can get 2-3 surveillance satellites and 6-8 communications satellites and at least 4 AWACS type aircraft, one in Edmonton, one in North Bay, one in Greenwood and one in Comox. And that is spread out over enough years to lessen budget impacts. Maintaining such assets will likely run $1-2 billion. It won't be cheap.
Your second point, how will we fight? That has changed just a bit in the last 3 years. Ukraine has shown how effective drones can be to turn an ordinary 155mm howitzer in to sniper rifle. Or how old mortar shells can really rain on a tanker's parade when served by FPV Drones. You will always need boots on the ground, and keels in the water/under the water, if you want to have any say. The Inuit survived up there for 10-12000 years, so we can do it too. We may want to recruit some of the black flies for Special Operations missions, but if we have smaller units with a 6 pack of vehicles suited to the roles needed, supported by air and sea, and we could easily conduct raids, or even besiege an invader if we can't take them down straight off. Take a 105mm gun off an old Leopard I and mount it onto an LAV with muskeg tires, and wheel that up under cover of snow or distraction in the midnight sun, and from almost 2 miles away, you can start hitting things.
Now, we can see the enemies encroaching on our bases at either end of the Northwest Passage, with clear intentions to land and occupy the base. Would the government of the day have the will to fight? That will be a challenge to see in any crystal ball. The politics in the US is teetering on the brink of implosion or a civil war. The Russians may cast their reach in a gamble to get sanctions removed or in a simple case of piracy. And their Chinese overlords would want to have to way to manipulate world shipping if need. Would the current Prime Minister make the call and send in the CAF? I think he would. Poilievre would not.
I may be old and remembering my time in with some rose coloured tinting, but I think the current members of the CAF would fight. There is something in the way we were trained, to build leadership, camaraderie, and esprit de corps that made it an immediate action for us, and based on what I saw in Afghanistan, that hasn't changed. There were officers and NCO's to whom you would instinctive trust your life five minutes after meeting them. There were also a few you wanted to shoot before they got you needlessly killed, but they were few and far between. When it comes down to it, we are still family. And you stand with your family. There are good people out there, many of whom would stand to if needed. Not all of my friends are fit to fight, but if it came down to it, we would give anyone a very rough time. And once the younger crowd puts the pieces together, they would show up. Like a herd of spastic horses at first, but they would show up. And there are enough things you can do to an invading force to make it very unpleasant for them to occupy territory. There are enough former CAF with training to lead guerilla operations and to help educate people on how to resist.
So there we have the first couple of ideas to go into an overall strategy. We are a nation of reluctant warriors, but we will fight. Now to show the world what leadership and courage can do. Time to roll up our collective sleeves, eh?
Next time, I'll take a run at we would need at a local level, from the police to the Militia Armouries, and see how they would fit in to an overall strategy.
I look forward to your input on our rough draft for a National Defense Strategy.
Pearson said our Arctic devence was scorched ice. Walt Natnczyk said his plan was to help recue the invaders. Still think those are the basics of Arctic defence.
This strikes me as an excellent summary of the current situation, and very useful recommendations. Especially limiting the number of F-35s to be purchased, and not trying to open an Arctic base.
BC6, sadly, I find you, like many others, misinformed on F-35.
We can debate the merits and feasibility of mixed fleets, but the bottom line is that non-5th gen fighters are just not survivable in major combat operations. What makes anyone think that NATO missions are any different than NORAD missions from a threat perspective? The only reason European nations are flying other jets is because they bought them before F-35 was available.
EVERY country that has run a fighter competition with F-35 as a contender has chosen F-35.
Sending our pilots into a fight in a 4th or 4.5 gen jet puts them at significantly greater risk of being killed in any combat scenario.
For an army comparison, sending pilots into battle in a Gripen against a 5th or 6th gen adversary would be like sending infantry into a high end fight in an M113 or a Grizzly.
You’ve spoken about the importance of lethality. Survivability is at least as important.
I’d also be interested in hearing about what you define as a “Canadian AWACS” aircraft.
Spot on Op! Regarding the F-35 issue, I agree with your recommendation also. The F-35 is unmatched in capability, but also horrendously costly/per hour of flight. In addition, its sortie rate is very poor. Further, it's overkill for low contested missions like North & Arctic patrols. The below letter of fiction introduces a new wrinkle to the mix - a domestically produced/IAR Free UCAV. The UCAV would fly ahead of the Gripen or F-35, greatly enhancing their capabilities and survivability. Similar in design/capabilities to MQ-28 Ghost Bat.
Note: An LLM was used to enhance this output:
MEMORANDUM
To: The Honourable Minister of National Defence
From: BC6
Date: May 2025
Subject: Integrated Recommendation for Canada's Future Fighter Force Structure – Tiered Mixed Fleet Approach with Domestic UCAV Development
Executive Summary
This memorandum formally recommends Canada adopt a tiered mixed-fleet fighter structure, consisting of:
50 Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II (currently contracted)
38 Saab JAS 39E Gripen (newly acquired)
60 Boreal Ghost UCAVs (domestic development via Saab–Bombardier joint venture)
This integrated model delivers comprehensive operational capability, aligns mission roles effectively to platform strengths, and achieves significant life-cycle savings (~30%), greater operational flexibility, enhanced industrial sovereignty, and ITAR-free export potential.
Strategic Context & Challenges:
Canada must meet complex and diverse mission sets including:
1. NORAD obligations: Air sovereignty and air defense over vast, challenging geographic regions.
2. NATO commitments: Expeditionary, high-intensity combat readiness.
3. Arctic sovereignty: Persistent and cost-effective surveillance and response.
5. Industrial sovereignty: Reducing vulnerability to geopolitical risks, including potential U.S. policy volatility.
An all–F-35A fleet, while technologically advanced and seamlessly integrated into NORAD/U.S. sensor frameworks, is financially unsustainable and operationally excessive for routine NORAD patrols, QRA, and low-threat missions.
Proposed Integrated Tiered Fleet Structure
The following clearly defines how each aircraft type is optimized to mission profiles, providing maximum operational efficiency and strategic capability:
Tier Primary Missions Assigned Platforms
Tier 1 (High) Contested Airspace, Strat. NORAD Ops, NATO High-Intense F-35A Lightning II - 50
Tier 2 (Medium) NORAD QRA, Routine Air Policing, Moderate-Threat Patrol Gripen E - 38 a/c
3. Strengthens domestic aerospace capabilities and supply chain resilience.
Resolving the Operational-Cost Dilemma
The recommended tiered fleet resolves Canada's core dilemma of maintaining seamless NORAD/U.S. integration while ensuring cost-efficient peacetime operations:
F-35A: Retains high-end NORAD/NATO interoperability and advanced contested-airspace capability.
Gripen E & UCAVs: Assume routine peacetime missions and medium-threat roles, significantly improving affordability and operational sustainability.
This structure explicitly matches capability to mission profiles—maximizing each platform’s effectiveness while minimizing unnecessary costs.
Implementation Recommendations:
1. Formal adoption of the proposed tiered fleet as Canada’s fighter structure model.
2. Immediate initiation of Phase 1 (concept feasibility) for the Boreal Ghost UCAV.
3. Negotiation with Saab AB on Gripen acquisition, emphasizing comprehensive industrial offsets.
4. Establishment of joint Saab–Bombardier UCAV venture with Innovation Canada funding.
Development of tailored NORAD command-and-control frameworks optimizing the integration of F-35, Gripen, and UCAV operations.
Final Recommendation & Endorsement
The Strategic Capabilities Advisory Group strongly endorses this tiered, integrated fleet strategy as the optimal solution to Canada’s complex strategic requirements. It delivers robust, multi-tier operational capability, substantial cost savings, and long-term economic and industrial sovereignty.
Never studied the Alaska boundary dispute of 1903 in detail, but does your proposal put enough weight to being on the ground with enough force for the artic mini bases that you suggested? Sovereignty doesn't just come from the air. If Ukraine can shoot down jets from a drone boat, why not advance Canadian interests with a multi force approach and relegate NORAD as a legacy application with a narrow remit for sending US forces only to defend themselves while providing the US with only the data and intelligence they need from our sensor networks. The sad state of affairs for the next (??) years is that Hegseth would not order the US to lift a finger to defend Canada. Why would Canada put another nickel into NORAD when the return to Canada is effectively zero or even negative. Even if there is regime change in the US the immolation of trust will last for generations.
Fully agree BC6! Interoperability with the US & integration into NORAD does not mean we must surrender sovereign capabilities... RCAF (& RCN & CA) does not need to be the US to work with the US... It's not as though the US doesn't work closely with other partners like the UK after all.
Some degree of separation & sovereign ability to observe, detect & defend (like OTHR, RADARSAT & a larger fighter capability than the 88 (or slightly reduced) F-35s I see as being essential to having options... Options to defend ourselves when the US is busy or simply uninterested (we can have shared interests... But I think it shoild be obvious our interests will not always align with those of the US...).
As for basing in the North... I concur that a full-on "CFB" is likely unsustainable. Instead, we could leverage dual use infrastructure (airfields & ports primarily) to set up small FOLs (or call the FOBs if the word "base" is politically important). A FOB in say, Whitehorse, Resolute, Churchill, Iqaluit... Inuvik, maybe Grey's Bay & Alert? You could also add existing bases like Yellowknife & Goose Bay to the list.
Size them to support a Light Inf Coy Gp & a 6 pack of Gripen (taking advantage of their fairly unique ability to operate from austere conditions with limited ground support) for a month. Rotate occupation of FOBs so that you have continuous presence in the North without having to set up the very substantial infrastructure & accomodations & everything else required for a full CFB.
All of this and nothing about tracking Santa? I'm deeply disappointed. My husband has worked hard on that campaign over the years😄
To be honest, I completely forgot about that! My daughter would be pretty unhappy with me!
Thanks for an informative update. From the 50's school days when "duck and cover" was introduced as response to nuclear war, most people go on living with hope and prayers. Military investment always seemed best left to "sometime later" for concern. Recently techie griftors are making it seem like now is surely the time.
Yes to all that, but it still seems to be overly constrained within an air domain context, once again assuming only the CAF will work this problem. If we consider a broader joint/interdepartmental paradigm, I can see a network of planes, satellites, ground stations, and appropriately designed/equipped ships (Imagine CF Base Cambridge Bay and CF Base Resolute). The placement and building of radar stations can serve as local development/employment too. All this in support of the 'build Canadian stuff to be under Canadian control' approach.
I'm warming to the idea of a two-fighter fleet in the RCAF, one for North America, the other for NATO. I get the traditional angst over multi-fleet complications, but I like the idea of a significantly larger air force that has the capacity to launch and sustain numerous Arctic region interceptions over a significant period of time (and not rely on US aircraft). We need capacity as well as capability. Growth would support permanent basing in the North... which is where other government departments would come in to support such development.
I also think the time is coming when we will have to talk about NATO operations in the Arctic Region. Maybe Canada can host the NATO Allied Command Arctic HQ in Churchill, or Iqaluit.
Usually unaddressed in these kinds of discussions is the distinct challenge of defending ourselves all the kit we would permanently base in the Arctic. There are obvious threats from hypersonic weapons. How do we defend Alert today? Masset? Gander? How would we defend the results of future developments and deployments?
Our defence conversations in Canada are still too nice. We must not only see what is coming (whether aimed at Canada or en route to the US), we must be prepared and able to kill it, preferably before its over our land mass.
Herein lies the problem, and I couldn’t get into multiple levels of detail in a short piece. I write for the layman, not the expert.
You make excellent points, though, and I’m entirely on net. The problem will become that the government will need to invest in *lethal* capabilities, something you and I both know they’re reluctant to do. We need to get the CAF out of the constabulary business; that means platforms that are properly equipped to deal with threats.
I’ve said elsewhere that I think “bases” in the traditional sense are a non-starter, largely for infrastructure and support/quality of life reasons. Will we get there? Maybe, but it would take a substantial effort and multiple levels of buy-in.
We’re stuck with NORAD but we can do a *lot* to increase our sovereign participation, as you point out.
I agree with your dislike of talk about 'plunking' a base down here or there and calling it a capability. The fundamental issue here is the absence of a national effort to really develop the North, an effort within which there would be a catalytic role for well-placed CF bases. But even then, in the absence of an overall strategic concept of how we will defend Canada, it is difficult to envision, let alone rationalize the broad laydown/network of bases required across the country. Maybe we go beyond your 'traditional' sense of what a 'base' is. There's room for imagination here, given modern technology, AI, and capable Canadians across the North,.
This is true, but I’m not sure the modern CAF could sustain isolated installations where units are permanently stationed.
Why?
Because, as I’ve pointed out elsewhere, the troops expect - as you certainly know - infrastructure that currently can’t be supported in the North and won’t be for some time. This mainly centres on family support and support for spouses working careers of their own. Moreover, we’d be looking at a massive investment in housing, etc..
I just don’t think the North is ready for that yet.
But we do indeed need a coherent, global strategy. If you’ve read my article on Arctic defence, I’m not entirely convinced that we should be putting all our eggs in the Arctic basket.
i have been puzzling over how we as a nation could maintain an effective presence in the North, with a lethal combined arms force, and a few ideas keep coming back. Having only been an Eleve Officier, my detailed knowledge is thin, but the logic make sense. To me at least.
The original design for a tank based force as suggest by De Gaulle is a good starting point: since we have an enormous area to cover, a highly mobile force or groups permanently deployed to the field would be the most effective way to bring boots, bombs and drones to bear on any intruders or invaders. Amphibious units combined with helicopter mobile vehicles, with submarines as scouts and possibly even supply vessels, would be able to establish temporary bases from which fixed wing aircraft could operate, and can serve as base camps for patrolling. And when its time to move on, the runway is packed up and moves
Radar systems that need a permanent base and power will always be a problem, but having very mobile air defences with some fixed ground defences to slow and entangle any assaulting forces would give a mobile response time to counter-attack.
Maintaining such a force would be expensive since the North demands extreme attention to detail and preparation of you want to survive, let alone fight. But as opposed to dotting the North with fixed bases, I think t would be more cost effective.
If we were able to field a Brigade to support NATO, I think a couple of Airborne Regiments equipped with sufficient helicopters, some winter-proven, Chinook transportable LAV that could be fitted out to carry mortars, radar, AAA, SAM, C&C, and maybe some larger calibre direct fire gun would bring enough lethal firepower to bear.
And the Navy would need a similar variety of smaller vessels for patrolling, and intercepting intruders. The Navy would need amphibious assets to assist in moving the units around: muskeg is impassible in the endless summer sun, where the ability to use rivers, lakes and muskeg to get around would be essential. Does anyone remember the old “Hammer’s Slammers”? While far from silent, large and small hovercraft would get around far faster than even fast shallow draft boats. And they work well to break up ice, as we’ve seen on the St. Lawrence.
And yes, the RCAF will need some serious investment: 2-3 tanker aircraft, 2-3 AWACS style aircraft, satellites, and last but no least, some fixed wing aircraft from transports to air superiority, that can manage the weather up North.
And lets not forget the Drones. Each Regiment would need integral drone assets, for both above and below surface hunting. And it will take some good old Canadian engineering and know how to make them effective in the cold. Imagine a sub loitering in the NW Passage, when a swarm of Canadian made drone swarm surrounds it, like the biting flies in summer?
The politics to pull all this together will be as equally complicated as the terrain is. But we cannot allow another power like Russia or the US to lay claim by virtue of an undersea mountain range and a few icebreakers poking around. The question is how to pay for it all, because we will need to maintain another regimental sized force in Eastern Europe for the foreseeable future along with Air and Sea assets.
Mr. Carney is going to have to dust off that old magical hat and start searching for some rabbits to get the party started. We have some serious nation building to do. Let’s hope that he can get better trading partners in the East and West, and maybe the Southern Hemisphere, to reduce our reliance on the US. He has a strong bench from which to build his team. Let’s hope they are up for it.
You certainly pack a lot in here, but let me push further. Your remarks are appropriately generic when mentioning a number of capabilities, but we still lack the overall grand-strategic concept that can answer the question, why do we need all that? What will we do with it?
It is an interesting challenge to describe how Canada will fight and prevail in defending itself without mentioning any of: 2% GDP; bases; drones; artillery, fighter jets, or other specific items. Conjure up a sufficiently broad scenario without saying anything about money (not unimportant, but that comes later...).
First, will we fight? Will government have the 'right stuff' to actually motivate Canadians to fight and then have the brains to oversee the national effort. Think about the nature of Ukrainians and their government today. I'm impressed.
Second, how will we fight? Will we actually meet an enemy at the extremities of our sovereign territory, in conventional warfare? I suggest there is some serious study and research to be done here because there has never been a truly "Arctic war" in history. I cannot imagine a more difficult theatre than our Arctic island archipelago. It is a desolate area where everything involves strategic distances, exposed lines of communication, a constant contest between surviving and fighting, and an array of geo-physical forces not found elsewhere on earth (the North Pole is constantly on the move). We might meet an enemy head-on in one place, but redeploying to another threatened sector, at scale, is a monstrous challenge. Sustainment difficulties boggle the mind.
Or, will we do what Russia did to Napoleon, and suck an intruder far into our land mass and then, with the nation in arms, cut them off in the North and let them freeze to death (or be driven crazy by blackflies), or conduct guerrilla warfare and kill enemy troops in the streets of Vancouver, Edmonton, Saskatoon, Winnipeg, Sault Ste. Marie, Timmins, Toronto, Ottawa, Montreal, Quebec City, Fredericton, Halifax and St. John's? I bet THAT scenario has never come up in a staff college exercise.
In fact, I don't think any staff college (or CAF staff planner for that matter) has ever dealt with any true grand strategy, mobilizing all elements of national power and calling upon all Canadians to fight, in some way. Listen to every defence discussion today and they are all grounded on the narrow assumption that only the CAF will fight. Beyond superficial "Canada not for sale ballcaps, and booing national anthems, and buying Canadian," we've got a serious national will challenge ahead of us.
I'll save my thoughts on the modern nature of Canada's population for later. Spoiler alert, we need more team players and less of those individuals who think its all about them and their feelings.
I concur that the Canadian government and the CAF has not had an overall strategy marking out their priorities in defending the North, or the rest of the country for that matter. I am going to assume that they figured there was no point if a conflict with the USSR went nuclear. Now we are faced with having to defend our sovereignty from two nuclear equipped powers, in the face of asymmetric warfare by the US.
We will be entering an era of open chaos in North America. There are forces operating behind the scenes in the US, Europe and Asia that may see the destruction of the continental US. One scenario that has a growing probability is a break up with billionaires claiming ownership of entire States that have gone bankrupt. And there is a real possibility of famine. Most of the food production in the US is done by immigrant labour, and in States like Nebraska, a significant portion have just left, fearing ICE arrest. So now farmers are unable to plant crops, let alone harvest, as are ranchers and food processors. The billionaires like Peter Thiel and others will use their borrowing capacity to pick up the bankrupted farms and form them into their own kingdoms. Think of Medieval mainland Europe. Already JD Vance is involved in buying up farms through a company called AcreTrader. And it isn't too much of a reach to see the billionaires using mercenary armies like Black Rock to help with the acquisition plans.
So there is an imperative to get to work and build a strategic plan to defend our country.
Now we do have some use for the North, especially with regards to shipping. A usable North West Passage, even if it was open for only half a year would be a shortcut between Europe and the Far East, enough to take weeks off delivery schedules, and save the Canadian Import/Export concerns enough to take notice. It also would provide an alternative route for imports/exports to and from Western Canada if the Great Lakes become unavailable to us.
So we would need to be able to control the Territorial Waters from the Beaufort to the Davis Strait, and up to Ellesmere Island. And this is where my detailed knowledge of costs and capabilities is lacking. But I've always been watching the various conflicts around the globe, and I have a rough idea of what the current CAF capacities are. The Navy's ships haven't changed much in basic design since WWI, for example, so the basic strategy remains the same. See them before the see us, get there first and with enough firepower to destroy the enemy.
The Navy would require surface ships equipped for ice-breaking and sub hunting, submarines to cover under the Ice Cap, and drones to add firepower and supplement reconnaissance capabilities. And the Navy would be the first to benefit from having satellite surveillance and communications. So the first order of building an overall strategy will be to get eyes in the sky. If we cannot produce our own satellites, I'm sure we can buy them from the Europeans and have them launched from an ESA pad. As a stop gap, our own version of an AWACS aircraft with enhanced loitering capacity could help. I'm going to guess that to bring them online would be between $5-10 billion cdn and take 5-7years, with some measure of urgency. You may have a better idea of relative costs, but I think for that kind of money, we can get 2-3 surveillance satellites and 6-8 communications satellites and at least 4 AWACS type aircraft, one in Edmonton, one in North Bay, one in Greenwood and one in Comox. And that is spread out over enough years to lessen budget impacts. Maintaining such assets will likely run $1-2 billion. It won't be cheap.
Your second point, how will we fight? That has changed just a bit in the last 3 years. Ukraine has shown how effective drones can be to turn an ordinary 155mm howitzer in to sniper rifle. Or how old mortar shells can really rain on a tanker's parade when served by FPV Drones. You will always need boots on the ground, and keels in the water/under the water, if you want to have any say. The Inuit survived up there for 10-12000 years, so we can do it too. We may want to recruit some of the black flies for Special Operations missions, but if we have smaller units with a 6 pack of vehicles suited to the roles needed, supported by air and sea, and we could easily conduct raids, or even besiege an invader if we can't take them down straight off. Take a 105mm gun off an old Leopard I and mount it onto an LAV with muskeg tires, and wheel that up under cover of snow or distraction in the midnight sun, and from almost 2 miles away, you can start hitting things.
Now, we can see the enemies encroaching on our bases at either end of the Northwest Passage, with clear intentions to land and occupy the base. Would the government of the day have the will to fight? That will be a challenge to see in any crystal ball. The politics in the US is teetering on the brink of implosion or a civil war. The Russians may cast their reach in a gamble to get sanctions removed or in a simple case of piracy. And their Chinese overlords would want to have to way to manipulate world shipping if need. Would the current Prime Minister make the call and send in the CAF? I think he would. Poilievre would not.
I may be old and remembering my time in with some rose coloured tinting, but I think the current members of the CAF would fight. There is something in the way we were trained, to build leadership, camaraderie, and esprit de corps that made it an immediate action for us, and based on what I saw in Afghanistan, that hasn't changed. There were officers and NCO's to whom you would instinctive trust your life five minutes after meeting them. There were also a few you wanted to shoot before they got you needlessly killed, but they were few and far between. When it comes down to it, we are still family. And you stand with your family. There are good people out there, many of whom would stand to if needed. Not all of my friends are fit to fight, but if it came down to it, we would give anyone a very rough time. And once the younger crowd puts the pieces together, they would show up. Like a herd of spastic horses at first, but they would show up. And there are enough things you can do to an invading force to make it very unpleasant for them to occupy territory. There are enough former CAF with training to lead guerilla operations and to help educate people on how to resist.
So there we have the first couple of ideas to go into an overall strategy. We are a nation of reluctant warriors, but we will fight. Now to show the world what leadership and courage can do. Time to roll up our collective sleeves, eh?
Next time, I'll take a run at we would need at a local level, from the police to the Militia Armouries, and see how they would fit in to an overall strategy.
I look forward to your input on our rough draft for a National Defense Strategy.
Nous nous souviendrons.
We are Canadian.
Pearson said our Arctic devence was scorched ice. Walt Natnczyk said his plan was to help recue the invaders. Still think those are the basics of Arctic defence.
This strikes me as an excellent summary of the current situation, and very useful recommendations. Especially limiting the number of F-35s to be purchased, and not trying to open an Arctic base.
BC6, sadly, I find you, like many others, misinformed on F-35.
We can debate the merits and feasibility of mixed fleets, but the bottom line is that non-5th gen fighters are just not survivable in major combat operations. What makes anyone think that NATO missions are any different than NORAD missions from a threat perspective? The only reason European nations are flying other jets is because they bought them before F-35 was available.
EVERY country that has run a fighter competition with F-35 as a contender has chosen F-35.
Sending our pilots into a fight in a 4th or 4.5 gen jet puts them at significantly greater risk of being killed in any combat scenario.
For an army comparison, sending pilots into battle in a Gripen against a 5th or 6th gen adversary would be like sending infantry into a high end fight in an M113 or a Grizzly.
You’ve spoken about the importance of lethality. Survivability is at least as important.
I’d also be interested in hearing about what you define as a “Canadian AWACS” aircraft.
Spot on Op! Regarding the F-35 issue, I agree with your recommendation also. The F-35 is unmatched in capability, but also horrendously costly/per hour of flight. In addition, its sortie rate is very poor. Further, it's overkill for low contested missions like North & Arctic patrols. The below letter of fiction introduces a new wrinkle to the mix - a domestically produced/IAR Free UCAV. The UCAV would fly ahead of the Gripen or F-35, greatly enhancing their capabilities and survivability. Similar in design/capabilities to MQ-28 Ghost Bat.
Note: An LLM was used to enhance this output:
MEMORANDUM
To: The Honourable Minister of National Defence
From: BC6
Date: May 2025
Subject: Integrated Recommendation for Canada's Future Fighter Force Structure – Tiered Mixed Fleet Approach with Domestic UCAV Development
Executive Summary
This memorandum formally recommends Canada adopt a tiered mixed-fleet fighter structure, consisting of:
50 Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II (currently contracted)
38 Saab JAS 39E Gripen (newly acquired)
60 Boreal Ghost UCAVs (domestic development via Saab–Bombardier joint venture)
This integrated model delivers comprehensive operational capability, aligns mission roles effectively to platform strengths, and achieves significant life-cycle savings (~30%), greater operational flexibility, enhanced industrial sovereignty, and ITAR-free export potential.
Strategic Context & Challenges:
Canada must meet complex and diverse mission sets including:
1. NORAD obligations: Air sovereignty and air defense over vast, challenging geographic regions.
2. NATO commitments: Expeditionary, high-intensity combat readiness.
3. Arctic sovereignty: Persistent and cost-effective surveillance and response.
4. Fiscal responsibility: Sustainable long-term defense expenditure.
5. Industrial sovereignty: Reducing vulnerability to geopolitical risks, including potential U.S. policy volatility.
An all–F-35A fleet, while technologically advanced and seamlessly integrated into NORAD/U.S. sensor frameworks, is financially unsustainable and operationally excessive for routine NORAD patrols, QRA, and low-threat missions.
Proposed Integrated Tiered Fleet Structure
The following clearly defines how each aircraft type is optimized to mission profiles, providing maximum operational efficiency and strategic capability:
Tier Primary Missions Assigned Platforms
Tier 1 (High) Contested Airspace, Strat. NORAD Ops, NATO High-Intense F-35A Lightning II - 50
Tier 2 (Medium) NORAD QRA, Routine Air Policing, Moderate-Threat Patrol Gripen E - 38 a/c
Tier 3 (Flexible) ISR, Patrol, Attritable SEAD/DEAD, Strike Mass, Decoy Ops UCAV - 60 units
Benefits of Tiered Approach:
1. Clearly aligns aircraft to mission profiles.
2. Significantly reduces operational cost and extends service life of high-value platforms.
3. Leverages UCAVs for attrition-tolerant, persistent, high-risk roles.
Cost Comparison (Peacetime Operations)
Aircraft Cost per Flight Hour (CAD) Annual per Aircraft (300 hrs)
F-35A Lightning II ~$44,000 ~$13.2M
Gripen E ~$10,000 ~$3.0M
Boreal Ghost UCAV ~$5,000 ~$1.5M
By shifting routine peacetime missions to Gripen E and UCAV platforms, Canada dramatically improves cost-effectiveness and fleet sustainability.
Expanded Industrial and Economic Benefits
Saab–Bombardier Joint Venture (Boreal Ghost UCAV) - or other domestic JVs
A domestically developed UCAV ensures significant Canadian aerospace investment:
Joint Venture Partners: Saab AB, Bombardier Aerospace, CAE, and Canadian SMEs.
Locations: Primarily Montreal and Toronto aerospace clusters.
Core Activities: Composite structures, avionics integration, AI/autonomous systems, stealth design, modular payload integration.
Estimated Economic Impact (2026–2045):
Economic Metric Estimated Value (CAD)
Direct Annual Jobs ~1,250–1,500 (avg. per year)
Peak Jobs (2028–2035) ~2,200
Indirect/Induced Jobs ~3,500–4,500 (multiplier ~2.8x)
R&D Investment ~$850M–$1.1B
Domestic Content per UCAV ~$18–20M (~75%)
Export Potential (10 yrs) ~$2.5–4.5B
Total Canadian GDP Impact ~$7.5–8.5B over 20 years
Strategic Sovereignty Benefits:
1. Complete ITAR-free status ensures sovereign export control.
2. Enhances Canada's defense-industrial independence.
3. Strengthens domestic aerospace capabilities and supply chain resilience.
Resolving the Operational-Cost Dilemma
The recommended tiered fleet resolves Canada's core dilemma of maintaining seamless NORAD/U.S. integration while ensuring cost-efficient peacetime operations:
F-35A: Retains high-end NORAD/NATO interoperability and advanced contested-airspace capability.
Gripen E & UCAVs: Assume routine peacetime missions and medium-threat roles, significantly improving affordability and operational sustainability.
This structure explicitly matches capability to mission profiles—maximizing each platform’s effectiveness while minimizing unnecessary costs.
Implementation Recommendations:
1. Formal adoption of the proposed tiered fleet as Canada’s fighter structure model.
2. Immediate initiation of Phase 1 (concept feasibility) for the Boreal Ghost UCAV.
3. Negotiation with Saab AB on Gripen acquisition, emphasizing comprehensive industrial offsets.
4. Establishment of joint Saab–Bombardier UCAV venture with Innovation Canada funding.
Development of tailored NORAD command-and-control frameworks optimizing the integration of F-35, Gripen, and UCAV operations.
Final Recommendation & Endorsement
The Strategic Capabilities Advisory Group strongly endorses this tiered, integrated fleet strategy as the optimal solution to Canada’s complex strategic requirements. It delivers robust, multi-tier operational capability, substantial cost savings, and long-term economic and industrial sovereignty.
Respectfully submitted,
Never studied the Alaska boundary dispute of 1903 in detail, but does your proposal put enough weight to being on the ground with enough force for the artic mini bases that you suggested? Sovereignty doesn't just come from the air. If Ukraine can shoot down jets from a drone boat, why not advance Canadian interests with a multi force approach and relegate NORAD as a legacy application with a narrow remit for sending US forces only to defend themselves while providing the US with only the data and intelligence they need from our sensor networks. The sad state of affairs for the next (??) years is that Hegseth would not order the US to lift a finger to defend Canada. Why would Canada put another nickel into NORAD when the return to Canada is effectively zero or even negative. Even if there is regime change in the US the immolation of trust will last for generations.
Fully agree BC6! Interoperability with the US & integration into NORAD does not mean we must surrender sovereign capabilities... RCAF (& RCN & CA) does not need to be the US to work with the US... It's not as though the US doesn't work closely with other partners like the UK after all.
Some degree of separation & sovereign ability to observe, detect & defend (like OTHR, RADARSAT & a larger fighter capability than the 88 (or slightly reduced) F-35s I see as being essential to having options... Options to defend ourselves when the US is busy or simply uninterested (we can have shared interests... But I think it shoild be obvious our interests will not always align with those of the US...).
As for basing in the North... I concur that a full-on "CFB" is likely unsustainable. Instead, we could leverage dual use infrastructure (airfields & ports primarily) to set up small FOLs (or call the FOBs if the word "base" is politically important). A FOB in say, Whitehorse, Resolute, Churchill, Iqaluit... Inuvik, maybe Grey's Bay & Alert? You could also add existing bases like Yellowknife & Goose Bay to the list.
Size them to support a Light Inf Coy Gp & a 6 pack of Gripen (taking advantage of their fairly unique ability to operate from austere conditions with limited ground support) for a month. Rotate occupation of FOBs so that you have continuous presence in the North without having to set up the very substantial infrastructure & accomodations & everything else required for a full CFB.