Drones Are Winning on YouTube, but…

Drone hype doesn’t change how wars are fought.

Literally every time I publish a post on defence, I get the same responses:

“Warfare has changed!”
“Drones have completely altered things and you’re ignoring them!”
“Tanks are dead!”

So, we’re going to take a break from my scheduled programming and talk about drones and their role on the modern battlefield. But I’ll state my position right up front, in case you don’t feel like reading further: the commenters are wrong, and they’re basing their conclusions on viral videos from Ukraine—a conflict that is unique in its ability to permit large-scale drone operations.

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The Death of the Tank

Amateur commentators have been declaring the death of the tank for decades. In 1973, it was the arrival of man-portable (the term then) anti-tank missiles and their use in the October Arab-Israeli War that sounded the death knell. Or air power. Or mines. Or precision-guided artillery. Or, or… you get the idea.

Now, we have the conflict in Ukraine, with a plethora of viral videos showing the apparent effectiveness of first-person video (FPV) drones against armour. We’re assured the battlefield is swarming with drones, ready to pounce on the slightest movement. Drones are used in terror attacks against Ukrainian cities, and by Ukraine for deep strikes and as a force multiplier. Indeed, Ukraine is easily the world leader in the use of drones of every type.

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Ukraine Is a Bad Example

But Ukraine is not fighting the Russians the same way NATO would fight them. While Ukraine has amazing soldiers and exceptional ability at the section and platoon level (translation: 40 soldiers or fewer), its leadership is, in my opinion, calcified and still using Soviet-era tactics—against an enemy that also uses Soviet-era tactics. This means very heavy reliance on artillery, linear advances, massed formations, and rigid command structures. It is not a system that encourages independent thinking or, critically, manoeuvre and mutual support.

The lack of innovative tactics and the inability to bring manoeuvre to the battlefield have led directly to the situation we have now: a virtual stalemate and a war of attrition. It isn’t that Ukraine didn’t try Western tactics—in 2023, they made a minor attempt that failed due to a lack of time, training, logistics, and air support. When this didn’t work, they abandoned the effort and fell back on what they knew: attrition. The result? Viral videos of incredibly brave Ukrainian tank crews venturing alone, with no infantry support and no mutual support from other tanks, to engage Russian targets. That isn’t how NATO would do business—at all.

Thus we have a perfect environment for drones to flourish: static targets, tanks separated from infantry and a total lack of mutual support, sporadic electronic warfare coverage, and piecemeal air defence—especially at the tactical level. An FPV drone operator can easily select and engage targets, dropping explosives into Russian trenches or through the open hatches of parked vehicles.

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The Canadian Way of War

I was trained completely differently, and to employ tactics that—even without the massive advances in technology—would make it quite difficult for FPV drones to wreak the havoc so many predict. Canadian armour is never used in isolation, and maintaining manoeuvre is always the objective.

The basic organisation is the combat team: an integrated force consisting of a tank squadron (19 tanks), an infantry company (approximately 120 soldiers, mounted in armoured personnel carriers—lethal weapons in their own right), an armoured engineer troop, a supporting artillery battery, and integrated logistics. To this can be added air defence, electronic warfare support, or dedicated air support. Finally, a combat team can be grouped into battle groups for larger operations.

The combat team always operates together. Tanks never, ever operate alone, and are always supported (within sight) by other tanks and infantry. Our tactics demand constant manoeuvre, speed, and shock action. On the battlefield, a tank is expected to move every time it fires and is always watched by the rest of the team. A typical engagement time for a Canadian crew in a Leopard 2 tank is as little as two to six seconds from acquiring a target to killing it. And this can be done on the move.

Canada follows a combined arms manoeuvre philosophy rooted in NATO principles. Movement is dictated by the need to:

• Maintain tempo, protection, and flexibility

• Avoid canalisation and always maintain flanking security

• Move in bounds with supporting infantry, recce, and engineers—especially in complex terrain

• Operate in platoons or troops (~4 tanks), depending on terrain and threat

Doctrinal emphasis is on:

• Speed of decision and action, especially during contact

• Mutual support through overlapping arcs of fire and dispersion to reduce vulnerability to artillery, drones, and air attack

• Maintaining initiative—the armoured force doesn’t just respond; it drives enemy reactions

The war in Ukraine displays little to none of this. It is a static, attritional conflict. A Western military would be constantly on the move, maintaining mutual support and operating as an integrated organisation—one that is always on guard against a drone or air threat. I believe that this constant focus on manoeuvring, on mutual support and protection, would make Ukraine-style drone operations far more difficult.

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Technological Advances

So that’s the tactical answer to drones. There’s a technological one too—and the drone threat isn’t the final word. While counter-drone technology is still in its infancy, there are already developments that may tip the balance. These include:

• Electronic systems to jam or disrupt drone control links

• Active protection systems to automatically engage drones, especially top-attack types

• Counter-drone munitions and systems are proliferating, including cheap laser-based systems and smart jammers

Here’s an example of what the British are doing—and this system could easily be operationalised:

Watch: UK Ministry of Defence RF System

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The Bottom Line

I’m not so delusional as to dismiss drones or technological disruption—but putting them in context is important.

• Warfare doesn’t pivot on one innovation

• Ukraine’s experience isn’t a blueprint for Western warfighting

• There’s a strong confirmation bias at play—people see tanks getting destroyed and think it proves a larger thesis, without context

• The death of tanks has been proclaimed prematurely more than once in history—and been wrong every time

No, the tank is not dead. Warfare is evolving—as it always has—but this is not the first time people have declared the death of armour. Drones are transformative, but so were machine guns, artillery, ATGMs, and IEDs. Like all major shifts, this one requires adaptation, not abandonment.