Perhaps the key element to the NATO combat strategy is first control the dies, then win the war. That's because with contested skies, tanks and artillery are vulnerable to the enemy's own air campaign.
At the same time, the emergence of small kamikaze drones has further harmed the ability of MBTs to operate the way they were intended. All the armor is designed to protect against anti-tank missiles designed a generation ago. Drones attack the weak points around the turret. This limits conventional use.
The next generation of MBTs is already in the design stage. Future tanks will provide protection from vertical attacks. Until they are available (a decade away?), kluge solutions will be necessary.
In my mind, the Black Sea and Kursk argue against the assertion that Ukraine's military is mired in WWII thinking.
If you follow the evolution of these concepts, from active defense to airland to full spectrum, I think it would too much to ask from Ukraine to jump to this concept immediately. What is realistic is the 1970's style active defense.
I think employing fully integrated combined arms tactics at the battle group level and below would certainly be within reach, especially after two and a half years. Unfortunately, as far as I know (realizing I have no special sources of information), nothing has been done in this regard at all. I agree, full spectrum ops immediately are likely a bridge too far, but baby steps.
…ukrainians are changing in to a contemporary war with whatever they have at their disposal, Ukraine never was or wanted to be a militarized country, they gave up their nukes in 1994 not to have this political, psychological and financial burden of it, when putin took Crimea, he cut Ukraine from even those scraps of military equipment they had left from soviet years, so and Ukrainian fleet in Sevastopol, so basically Ukraine had to get its military from scratch, same goes to all military personnel, you’re right about soviet “structure” of thinking, i served there 1974-76, but it bound to change along with new aspects and ways in fighting 21 century wars and its already happening, ukrainians are very lucky to have a leader as Zelensky, he stood up to the plate with not just everything he had, but with conviction, picking up very new and every available experience on the way, my only concern is internal politics which can can change a lot
I consider your feedback more accurately applies to the Russian forces. The AFU have gone through a tremendous learning curve since Feb. 2022 and have certainly made errors. The first counteroffensive was one. However they have adapted to having to make do, especially when congressional aid was halted for 6 months. Their drone warfare has innovated brilliantly and has been a game changer for modern warfare. They also demonstrated a classic combined arms operation in Kursk Oblast.
I’ve heard the same several times, so felt comfortable including that observation. As far as I know, the West provides little or no training above platoon level.
Perhaps the key element to the NATO combat strategy is first control the dies, then win the war. That's because with contested skies, tanks and artillery are vulnerable to the enemy's own air campaign.
At the same time, the emergence of small kamikaze drones has further harmed the ability of MBTs to operate the way they were intended. All the armor is designed to protect against anti-tank missiles designed a generation ago. Drones attack the weak points around the turret. This limits conventional use.
The next generation of MBTs is already in the design stage. Future tanks will provide protection from vertical attacks. Until they are available (a decade away?), kluge solutions will be necessary.
In my mind, the Black Sea and Kursk argue against the assertion that Ukraine's military is mired in WWII thinking.
If you follow the evolution of these concepts, from active defense to airland to full spectrum, I think it would too much to ask from Ukraine to jump to this concept immediately. What is realistic is the 1970's style active defense.
I think employing fully integrated combined arms tactics at the battle group level and below would certainly be within reach, especially after two and a half years. Unfortunately, as far as I know (realizing I have no special sources of information), nothing has been done in this regard at all. I agree, full spectrum ops immediately are likely a bridge too far, but baby steps.
…ukrainians are changing in to a contemporary war with whatever they have at their disposal, Ukraine never was or wanted to be a militarized country, they gave up their nukes in 1994 not to have this political, psychological and financial burden of it, when putin took Crimea, he cut Ukraine from even those scraps of military equipment they had left from soviet years, so and Ukrainian fleet in Sevastopol, so basically Ukraine had to get its military from scratch, same goes to all military personnel, you’re right about soviet “structure” of thinking, i served there 1974-76, but it bound to change along with new aspects and ways in fighting 21 century wars and its already happening, ukrainians are very lucky to have a leader as Zelensky, he stood up to the plate with not just everything he had, but with conviction, picking up very new and every available experience on the way, my only concern is internal politics which can can change a lot
I consider your feedback more accurately applies to the Russian forces. The AFU have gone through a tremendous learning curve since Feb. 2022 and have certainly made errors. The first counteroffensive was one. However they have adapted to having to make do, especially when congressional aid was halted for 6 months. Their drone warfare has innovated brilliantly and has been a game changer for modern warfare. They also demonstrated a classic combined arms operation in Kursk Oblast.
I’ve heard the same several times, so felt comfortable including that observation. As far as I know, the West provides little or no training above platoon level.