Strategic Assessment: Pre-emption, Perception, and the Iran Airstrikes
Peeling back the layers on a messy situation
I don’t like writing about the Middle East. The history is too poisonous, positions far too entrenched, opinions tainted by religious hatred, and it’s where nuance has come to die. But my hand has been forced.
At 0230 hours on 22 June 2025 (Iran time), the United States launched a series of airstrikes against Iranian nuclear targets, employing B‑2 stealth bombers to dispatch some 14 GBU‑57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator bombs against underground nuclear facilities in Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan, as well as some 30 Tomahawk cruise missiles against other targets. This was, in typical American fashion, dubbed Operation MIDNIGHT HAMMER. While no formal damage assessment has been made available, Donald Trump immediately claimed that the strikes were “very successful.”
The strikes followed, and seemed to directly support, Israeli pre-emptive and decapitation attacks that began on 13 June. Israel had apparently been pressing for several days for US participation, and the Americans began telegraphing their intentions for several weeks, including a bizarre call from Trump for Iran’s “unconditional surrender” on 17 June. This was preceded by the evacuation of some Americans from the Middle East and was followed by the obvious prepositioning of air assets such as aerial refuelling tankers.
That these strikes are problematic is an understatement.
Background: Murky Justifications and a Fractured Framework
The initial Israeli attacks were pre-emptive in nature and included decapitation attacks, sometimes in civilian areas, aimed at Iran’s leadership. Despite Iran’s support for terrorist organizations throughout the region, an obvious immediate casus belli appeared to be absent. Indeed, Israeli justification wasn’t aimed at the terrorist threat at all, but instead focused on Iran’s purported imminent breakout in its attempt to develop a nuclear weapon (as an aside, Israel has been presumed to have developed nuclear weapons decades ago).
This justification is somewhat murky. Iran had halted its nuclear weapons program as far back as 2003, and any covert operations were halted after the 2015 signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which limited Iran’s nuclear capability and placed the entire program under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). By all accounts this was successful, and the IAEA repeatedly certified Iran’s compliance with the treaty’s obligations.
Unfortunately, Donald Trump decided to complicate matters. Both Israel and the US accused Iran of failing to disclose its previous weapons program (the AMAD program discontinued in 2003), and Trump used this as an excuse to terminate US involvement with the JCPOA system and to reinstate sanctions on Iran. Entirely coincidentally, the JCPOA was negotiated under the Obama administration; Trump seems to have a bizarre antipathy towards anything accomplished by Obama.
Despite this, the IAEA continued to declare Iran in compliance, and the other signatories of the agreement refused to follow the US lead. American attempts to extend their sanctions regime into allied countries met with opposition and legislation to limit US extraterritorial directives. The US and Israel insisted their intelligence showed Iran was continuing to pursue a nuclear weapon and that the IAEA (and other JCPOA parties) were being bamboozled.
As the diplomatic path stalled, covert efforts intensified. Israel, with US support, began an active measures program to sabotage Iranian nuclear facilities and to assassinate Iranian nuclear scientists.
Acceleration, Assassinations, and Abandonment
It is possible that the IAEA was indeed being duped. Israel has a history of feeding the US selective intelligence material in an effort to solicit an American reaction in its favour. Whatever the case, Iran certainly accelerated nuclear research and production after Trump ordered the assassination of Qasem Soleimani in 2020. Iran ordered the abandonment of JCPOA enrichment limits and eventually had uranium enriched to 60% purity—similar to that used in nuclear weapons.
The Biden administration attempted to get the JCPOA back on the rails, but was unsuccessful by the time Trump came to power again in 2025.
Where Are We Now?
Trump took a much more belligerent approach to Iran and quickly aligned with Israeli policy: prevent Iran from gaining a nuclear weapon at any cost. Of course, Iran’s destabilizing actions and its profound antagonism toward Israel have done little to engender confidence in its sincerity about peace.
There are differing assessments of where Iran stands. Israeli suspicion remains extremely high and was not placated by IAEA reports (in May 2025) that Iranian levels of 60% enriched uranium exceeded anything required for civilian use.
In contrast, a US intelligence assessment in March 2025 found that Iran was not building a nuclear weapon and had nointention of doing so. Trump immediately disavowed this assessment, and it was later amended to align with his views—based on little more than personal intuition. It is likely he was being fed Israeli intelligence shaped by Netanyahu.
Ignoring his own agencies, Trump began “negotiations” with Iran, issuing a demand for “unconditional surrender” and giving a two-month deadline. There was little doubt what the consequences would be. On 12 June, the IAEA declared Iran “non-compliant with international agreements,” [edit: by Iran’s failure to track uranium stockpiles adequately and potential violations of storage requirements.] based on the May report. Israel launched its pre-emptive strikes the very next day.
Telegraphing the Blow
The “non-compliance” remains open to interpretation. The prevailing view is that Iran was not actively pursuing a weapon, but was building capacity to do so. On this basis, Israel launched its strikes. The US initially denied knowledge or coordination—claims that now appear hollow.
Trump’s denials ring especially false. US personnel had been warned to evacuate well in advance, and American prepositioning of aircraft and tankers was evident for a week. Iran, very likely anticipating such a scenario, had years to harden or relocate its assets.
While only the US has the deep-penetrating weapons needed to strike hardened facilities like Fordow and Natanz, there is a strong sense that Trump was eager to enforce his deadline, bolstered by the Christian fundamentalists in his administration (Mike Huckabee, now US Ambassador to Jerusalem, among them). Netanyahu, ever keen to draw the US closer to Israeli strategy, likely saw an opening—and took it.
Consequences Already Playing Out
Iran has now drafted a bill to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The region is on a war footing. Missile exchanges between Iran and Israel are ongoing. Trump, who initially celebrated the strikes as a technical and tactical triumph, may have spoken too soon.
Preliminary bomb damage analysis suggests the attacks on Fordow and Natanz may not have been as decisive as claimed. Iran had likely prepared for this possibility for years.
Some Analysis
Iranian air defence systems were totally ineffective and are now essentially non-existent. Both Israel and the US can operate with impunity over Iran, making restrikes significantly more likely.
Iran’s nuclear program has suffered very serious damage but is likely to continue in some form.
US attacks likely weren’t as effective as Trump has claimed, perhaps due in part to Iranian preparations.
Trump is almost certain to continue to make threats, including those aimed at regime change, but is unlikely to continue strikes at this point.
Iran will continue to launch missile strikes against Israeli population centres and will attempt to leverage its proxies to attack Israeli and US targets.
Direct Iranian attacks on American forces or facilities are extremely unlikely.
US messaging will remain extremely confused and based almost entirely on Trump’s views. Intelligence contradicting these views will be discarded.
Israel will continue to manoeuvre to draw the US closer, especially if the confrontation with Iran continues and deepens. This will be supported by elements within Trump’s orbit.
Iranian production capacity for missiles, rockets, and drones has likely seen minimal impact and will continue unabated. Provision of drones to Russia for use against Ukraine is likely to remain uninterrupted.
Given the murkiness of the intelligence, the pre-emptive nature of the Israeli and US attacks, the use of decapitation strikes, and the prevailing view that Iran was not near a deployable nuclear weapon, international support for Israel and the United States is likely to be lukewarm—when it’s not outright hostile.
Final Thoughts
I am firmly of the opinion that America's intervention in this conflict was driven entirely by Trump’s ego and desire to display toughness in light of several failures on the international stage. That this was egged on (or, indeed, engineered) by Netanyahu is more illustrative of the fecklessness of Trump than any grand Israeli scheme.
Worse, this crisis is being managed by an utterly incompetent administration in Washington, one that is beholden to the whims of an uneducated authoritarian. One hopes that some adults remain in the White House.
BC6, just yesterday: “Direct Iranian attacks on American forces or facilities are extremely unlikely.”
Welp, I was wrong there!
But I still don’t think the limited (ten missiles - apparently all intercepted) strike on Qatar is likely to escalate. It’s more of a signal. We shall see.
As far as military and geopolitical analyses go, you are a rock star! Lately I find myself becoming very tired of simplistic opinion commentators. There are far too many of these, many only pandering to specific audiences. Thank you again, and here is my paid subscription as well.